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We consider the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game with a set of 
feasible payoffs that is closed and comprehensive from below, contains the disagreement 
point in its interior, and is such that the individually rational payoffs are bounded. We 
show that a pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium having the no-delay property 
exists, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. We also have the converse 
result that randomization will not be used in this environment in the sense that all 
stationary subgame perfect equilibria do not involve randomization on the equilibrium 
path. Nevertheless, mixed strategy proﬁles can lead to Pareto superior payoffs in the non-
convex case.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many problems in economics are complicated by the presence of non-convexities. Scarf (1994) mentions the om-
nipresence of non-divisibilities in production as an important source of non-convexities in economics. Another example 
of non-convexities in production is the existence of production technologies with increasing returns to scale. Other impor-
tant cases of non-convexities result from non-convexities in preferences, even in the presence of lotteries when agents are 
not expected utility maximizers as is for instance the case in prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), or when 
randomization is not possible, and non-convexities in the consumption set, for instance caused by the presence of indivisi-
ble commodities. Although non-convexities are regarded important, most of the economic literature assumes them away for 
reasons of intractability.
Non-convexities are frequently studied in the n-person cooperative bargaining literature. There is for instance an 
extensive literature on the extension of the Nash bargaining solution to non-convex environments (Kaneko, 1980;
Conley and Wilkie, 1996; Mariotti, 1997; Zhou, 1997; Xu and Yoshihara, 2006).
On the contrary, the literature on strategic bargaining has not paid much attention to non-convexities, and if so, only 
for the case with two players. Rubinstein (1982) allows for modest forms of non-convexities. Under his hypothesis there is 
typically a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Herrero (1989) considers general non-convexities for the two-player case 
assuming the set of feasible payoffs to be strictly comprehensive and studies the convergence of pure stationary subgame 
perfect equilibria to the appropriately deﬁned Nash bargaining solution, but does not prove the existence of such equilibria. 
✩ The authors would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO) for ﬁnancial support.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: P.Herings@maastrichtuniversity.nl (P.J.-J. Herings), A.Predtetchinski@maastrichtuniversity.nl (A. Predtetchinski).http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.009
0899-8256/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
152 P.J.-J. Herings, A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 90 (2015) 151–161Conley and Wilkie (1995) also consider a strictly comprehensive set of feasible payoffs and introduce a bargaining protocol 
that implements their extension of the Nash bargaining solution.
Other notable exceptions are Lang and Rosenthal (2001), In and Serrano (2004), and Shimer (2006). Lang and Rosenthal
(2001) study wage bargaining between a union and a single-product ﬁrm which needs two types of workers in its pro-
duction process. The ﬁrm bargains with the union over wages for both worker types and is then free to set employment 
levels to maximize proﬁts. The objective function of the union includes the wage sum and, possibly, employment levels. For 
a standard Cobb–Douglas production function, it is shown that the resulting set of feasible payoffs is non-convex. In and 
Serrano (2004) study a bilateral two-issue bargaining procedure with an endogenous agenda. In the procedure, proposals 
must be made on only one issue at a time, although the proposer can choose which issue to bring to the table. The reduced 
form of this game, where subgame with a single issue remaining are replaced by the corresponding subgame perfect equi-
librium utilities, is one with a non-convex set of feasible payoffs. Shimer (2006) studies a model where a worker is allowed 
to quit the current job when offered a higher wage by a different employer. Thus when bargaining about the wage, both 
the worker and the ﬁrm take it into account that the employment will terminate as soon as the worker receives a better 
offer. As a result, the set of expected payoffs feasible for the worker and the ﬁrm fails to be convex. In particular, the ﬁrm’s 
proﬁt as a function of the wage can be discontinuous at the wage level equal to that of the ﬁrm’s competitors. All of the 
above-mentioned papers treat non-convexities in the two-player case only.
Existence of a pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in the canonical multilateral bargaining model has only been 
shown when the set of feasible payoffs is convex. The existence of such an equilibrium has been shown in Banks and 
Duggan (2000). Merlo and Wilson (1995) consider the n-person cake division problem and obtain the existence of a unique 
pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium when the set of feasible payoffs is convex and the proposer selection protocol 
is deterministic.
We consider the following canonical multilateral bargaining procedure. In each time period, nature randomly selects a 
player that is allowed to make a proposal. All players respond sequentially to the proposal and either vote in favor or against. 
As soon as a responder votes against the proposal, the procedure continues in the next period. If all responders vote in favor 
of the proposal, it is accepted, and the procedure ends. This model is probably the simplest model of multilateral bargaining 
known in the literature. Merlo and Wilson (1995), Banks and Duggan (2000), Eraslan (2002), Eraslan and Merlo (2002), 
and Kalandrakis (2006) are some of the many contributions which use a similar or a more general model of multilateral 
bargaining.
The bargaining game is fully characterized by the set of players, their discount factors, the set of feasible payoffs, and 
the probability according to which nature selects a particular proposer. The only assumptions we make regarding the set of 
feasible alternatives are non-substantial technical ones. We normalize the disagreement payoff to be zero and assume the 
set of feasible payoffs to be closed, comprehensive from below, and the set of non-negative feasible payoffs to be bounded 
from above. To make the bargaining problem non-trivial, it is moreover assumed that there is an alternative that gives all 
players a strictly positive payoff.
We show that this entire class of bargaining games has pure stationary subgame perfect equilibria that ensure immediate 
agreement. This result is surprising as the usual way to deal with non-convexities is to introduce lotteries. For that reason, 
one might have expected that the equilibria in non-convex bargaining games typically involve mixing. Similarly, one might 
have expected that non-convexities are a potential source for delay.
We also address the reverse question. Under what conditions are all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of a bargaining 
game in pure strategies without delay? The answer is that an extremely mild additional assumption assures this: When the 
set of weakly Pareto optimal alternatives coincides with the set of Pareto optimal ones, all stationary subgame perfect 
equilibria involve no randomization on the equilibrium path. Equilibria are characterized by the absence of delay.
To derive the ﬁrst main result, the existence result, we deviate from the usual proof strategy that basically exploits 
continuity of the best-response correspondences. In our non-convex setting, this correspondence may not be continuous. 
Instead, we construct an excess utility function that resembles the excess demand function as used in general equilibrium 
theory.
Let some proﬁle of utilities be given and consider for each player i the (potentially infeasible) proposal player i has 
to make in order to be consistent with this proﬁle of utilities. Coordinate i of the excess utility function is the degree of 
feasibility of this proposal. The excess utility function is shown to have a zero point by showing that it is not outward 
pointing. Next, a zero point is shown to induce a pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game.
To prove the second main result, roughly stating that all stationary subgame perfect equilibria are in pure strategies, 
we proceed in several steps. One of the main steps is to show that in a mixed stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, 
proposals offering strictly more than the continuation utility to all players are accepted with probability one, whereas 
proposals offering at least one player strictly less than the continuation utility are accepted with probability zero. The next 
main step is to argue that for every player there is a unique proposal which maximizes his utility subject to being accepted 
with probability one and that every mixed stationary subgame perfect equilibrium puts probability one on such a proposal.
Stationary subgame perfect equilibria are eﬃcient in the sense that every proposer selects a weakly Pareto optimal 
alternative. However, the fact that all equilibria are in pure strategies implies that equilibria may be ineﬃcient in a weaker 
sense. It is not diﬃcult to construct examples such that the equilibrium utilities are Pareto dominated by the utilities 
associated with some mixed strategy proﬁles.
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proves the converse result and Section 5 concludes.
2. The bargaining game
We consider the bargaining game  = (N, V , δ, θ). There is a set N of n individuals that have to select a single payoff 
vector in the set of feasible payoffs V , a non-empty subset of RN . The vector δ = (δi)i∈N consists of the players’ discount 
factors and θ = (θi)i∈N denotes the vector of probabilities according to which players are selected as a proposer. Individuals 
negotiate about the alternative to be selected using the procedure deﬁned as follows.
In every time period t , starting with t = 0, nature selects player i to be the proposer with probability θi . The selected 
player makes a proposal, a point in V . After observing the proposal of player i, all players (including the proposer) vote 
sequentially on the proposal, the order of their responses being history independent. Each player can either accept or reject 
the proposal. If the proposal is unanimously accepted, it is implemented. As soon as the ﬁrst rejection occurs, period t + 1
begins, with nature selecting a new proposer, and so on.
The utility to player i of agreement on v ∈ V in time period t is given by δti vi . The utility of perpetual disagreement is 
equal to 0 for all players. We denote the zero vector in RN by 0N . Players have von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions.
If v and v ′ are two vectors in RN , then we write v ≤ v ′ to mean vi ≤ v ′i for each i ∈ N , and we write v  v ′ to mean 
vi < v ′i for each i ∈ N . The set V is said to be comprehensive from below if whenever v ′ ∈ V , v ∈ RN and v ≤ v ′ , then 
v ∈ V . Our assumptions are as follows.
(A) The set V is closed, comprehensive from below, and it contains the point 0N in its interior. The set V+ = V ∩ RN+ is 
bounded.
(B) For all i ∈ N , the discount factor δi belongs to [0, 1).
We have put our assumptions directly on the set of feasible payoffs V . In other non-cooperative models, the primitives 
consist of an agreement space X and players with utility functions deﬁned on X . The set V is then given by the image of 
X under the proﬁle of utility functions (ui)i∈N , so both approaches are closely related.
Our assumptions on V are satisﬁed provided that the agreement space and the utility functions meet the following 
requirements:
[S0] the agreement space X takes the form of the product Y ×M , where Y is a compact (possibly ﬁnite) set, and the utility 
functions ui are continuous,
[S1] M = −RN+ and ui(y, m) → −∞ if mi → −∞,
[S2] ui(y, m) = ui(y, m′) if mi =m′i , and
[S3] there is a (y, m) ∈ Y × M such that ui(y, m) > 0 for each i ∈ N .
The role of the set M is to give every player the possibility to sacriﬁce an arbitrary amount of utility in order for the 
set V to be comprehensive from below. There are clearly many alternative speciﬁcations for M that would make the set 
V comprehensive from below. Also, we can weaken our comprehensiveness assumption to hold only on RN+ , so whenever 
v ′ ∈ V , v ∈RN+ and v ≤ v ′ , then v ∈ V . In that case our assumptions on V would be satisﬁed if S1 is replaced by
[S1′] M = {m ∈RN+ |
∑
i∈N mi ≤ c}, and ui(y, m) = 0 if mi = 0,
where c > 0 is the total available amount of some divisible commodity. When the set Y is ﬁnite or when the utility functions 
ui are not concave, then the resulting set V is typically not convex.
In speciﬁc models, like the ones studied by Lang and Rosenthal (2001) or Shimer (2006), our assumptions on V can 
easily be veriﬁed to hold true. In the set-up of In and Serrano (2004), where there are two issues but bargaining takes place 
on one issue at a time, the reduced game has typically a non-convex set of feasible payoffs. The reduced game would satisfy 
our assumptions on V , also if there are more than two players.
A pure stationary strategy of an individual i with θi > 0 speciﬁes a proposal xi and an individual acceptance set Ai . A sta-
tionary strategy of an individual i with θi = 0 speciﬁes only the individual acceptance set Ai . At every history where player 
i is selected as a proposer, he makes the proposal xi and at every history where player i has to respond, he accepts the pro-
posal currently on the table if and only if it belongs to Ai . A strategy proﬁle is a pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
(pure SSPE) if it is pure, stationary, and if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. A pure strategy proﬁle has the 
no-delay property if xi ∈ ∩ j∈N A j for all i ∈ N with θi > 0.
Theorem 2 in Banks and Duggan (2000) states that, if the set V satisﬁes the assumptions (A) and (B) and is convex, then 
there exists a pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium which satisﬁes the no-delay property. We demonstrate that it 
suﬃces to make assumptions (A) and (B). It follows in particular that convexity assumptions are not needed. Under the mod-
est additional assumption that weakly Pareto eﬃcient and Pareto eﬃcient points coincide, we also obtain the converse result 
that every stationary subgame perfect equilibrium uses pure strategies on the equilibrium path and does not involve delay.
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In this section we present a system of equations which is such that a solution to the system induces a pure SSPE.
Deﬁne the function g :RN →R by the equation
g(v) = sup{λ ∈R | v + (λ, . . . , λ) ∈ V }.
It is well-known that under Assumption (A) the function g has the following properties, where ∂V denotes the boundary 
of V :
[G0] v ∈ V if and only if g(v) ≥ 0, and v ∈ ∂V if and only if g(v) = 0,
[G1] g is continuous,
[G2] g(0N ) > 0,
[G3] g(vˆ) ≥ 0 and v ≤ vˆ implies g(v) ≥ 0,
[G4] g−1(R+) ∩RN+ is bounded.
Let N∗ = {i ∈ N | θi > 0} be the set of players with a strictly positive probability to become the proposer. For i ∈ N∗ , we 
deﬁne αi = (1 − δi + θiδi)/θi and we deﬁne the function pi :RN →RN by
pij(u) =
{
αiui, if j = i,
δ ju j, if j ∈ N \ {i}.
The idea behind the function pi is as follows. Suppose the game  admits a pure SSPE with the property that each 
proposal is immediately accepted and each proposer leaves every responder indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
proposal. This means that xij = δ ju j for j = i, where u denotes the vector of equilibrium utilities. Player i is the proposer 
with probability θi so his expected utility satisﬁes the equation ui = θi xii + (1 − θi)δiui . By rearranging terms we obtain that 
xii = αiui if i ∈ N∗ . The same rearrangement of terms shows that ui = 0 if i ∈ N \ N∗ . In what follows we shall demonstrate 
that there does exist an SSPE such that xi = pi(u) for every i ∈ N∗ and ui = 0 for every i ∈ N \ N∗ .
Let v¯ ∈RN++ be an upper bound on V+ , so every v ∈ V+ satisﬁes v ≤ v¯ .
We deﬁne the function z : [0N , ¯v] →RN as follows:
zi(u) =
{
g(pi(u)), if i ∈ N∗,
−ui, if i ∈ N \ N∗.
Consider some i ∈ N∗ . If zi(u) < 0, then there is no payoff vector in the set of feasible payoffs that gives player i a payoff of 
αiui and players j = i a payoff of δ ju j , so ui should be lowered. If zi(u) > 0, then there is a payoff vector in V that gives 
player i a payoff of strictly more than αiui and players j = i a payoff of δ ju j . In this case it is possible to increase ui . The 
function z is therefore related to an excess demand function as used in general equilibrium theory and we can think of z
as an excess utility function.
To ﬁnd equilibria in pure strategies, we are looking for solutions to the system of equations z(u) = 0N . Notice that the 
system of equations z(u) = 0N is different from the usual one used to demonstrate the existence of bargaining equilibria (see 
Merlo and Wilson (1995), Banks and Duggan (2000), Kalandrakis (2004, 2006)), where typically each player is maximizing 
his utility subject to meeting the reservation values. Our assumptions do not imply that the system of equations employed 
in the usual approach is continuous.
A zero point u∗ of z induces a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of  as follows. For i ∈ N∗ we deﬁne
x∗i = pi(u∗), (3.1)
and for i ∈ N we set
A∗i = {v ∈ V | vi > δiu∗i } ∪ {v ∈ V | vi = δiu∗i and ∀ j ∈ N∗ \ {i}, v j ≤ α ju∗j }. (3.2)
Whenever a player i has to propose, he makes the proposal x∗i . Whenever a player i has to respond, he accepts proposals 
that offer him strictly more utility than δiu∗i or that offer him exactly δiu
∗
i and do not offer more than α ju
∗
j for players 
j ∈ N∗ \ {i}. In this construction we exploit the freedom we have in case a player is indifferent between accepting and 
rejecting a proposal and make acceptance conditional on the utilities as proposed to all the players and not only the utility 
proposed to the responder himself. The alternative speciﬁcation where we would deﬁne the acceptance set of Player i to 
be equal to A∗i = {v ∈ V | vi ≥ δiu∗i } is in general not compatible with equilibrium existence. The speciﬁcation in Eq. (3.2)
prevents an optimizing proposer from asking more than αiu∗i for himself, since such a proposal would be rejected by all 
responders. When the set V contains points that are only weakly Pareto optimal as is for instance the case in Example 3.7, 
the proposal that maximizes the proposer’s utility subject to offering the other players their reservation values would yield 
the proposer strictly higher utility than αiu∗i , and this may be incompatible with equilibrium. Equilibrium play may require 
a proposer to settle for a weakly Pareto optimal proposal that is not Pareto optimal.
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stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game . For every i ∈ N∗ , it holds that x∗i ∈ ∂V .
Proof. It is well-known that the game  has the one-shot deviation property, meaning that if there is a subgame where a 
player has some proﬁtable deviation from a stationary strategy proﬁle, then there must also be a subgame where this player 
has a proﬁtable one-shot deviation, i.e. a single deviation by this player at the root of the subgame.
First observe that u∗ is the vector of expected payoffs of the strategy (x∗, A∗) since∑
i∈N∗
θi x
∗i =
∑
i∈N∗
θi p
i(u∗) = u∗.
Since z(u∗) = 0, it holds in particular that for every i ∈ N∗ , zi(u∗) = 0, so g(pi(u∗)) = 0. Consider some i ∈ N∗ . By 
Eq. (3.1) and Property G0 it holds that x∗i = pi(u∗) ∈ ∂V .
We verify that no player has a proﬁtable one-shot deviation. Suppose at some history h at time period t , player i ∈ N∗ is 
proposer and makes proposal xi ∈ V , potentially different from x∗i . Notice that x∗i is accepted leading to the expected utility 
δtiαiu
∗
i for player i. If x
i /∈ ∩ j∈N A∗ j , then it will be rejected, leading to an expected utility of δt+1i u∗i < δtiαiu∗i . If xi ∈ ∩ j∈N A∗ j
it will be accepted, leading to a utility of δti x
i
i . We argue that in the latter case x
i
i ≤ αiu∗i , so the expected utility to player i
of proposing xi is less than or equal to the expected utility of proposing x∗i . Since x∗i ∈ ∂V , xi ∈ V , and V is comprehensive 
from below, there is at least one j ∈ N such that xij ≤ x∗ij . If j = i, then xii ≤ x∗ii = αiu∗i and we are done. If j = i, then 
xij ≤ x∗ij = δ ju∗j . Since xi ∈ A∗ j , we have xij = δ ju∗j and for every k ∈ N∗ \ { j}, xik ≤ αku∗k , so in particular xii ≤ αiu∗i .
Suppose at some history h at time period t , player i ∈ N is responder to a proposal v ∈ A∗i . In equilibrium, player i
accepts. The expected utility to player i is δti vi if the other players accept and δ
t+1
i u
∗
i if some other player rejects, so the 
expected utility weakly exceeds δt+1i u
∗
i in any case. Would player i deviate to a rejection, then his expected utility equals 
δt+1i u
∗
i . Consider a proposal v /∈ A∗i , so in particular vi ≤ δiu∗i . In equilibrium, player i rejects, leading to expected utility 
δt+1i u
∗
i . A deviation to acceptance leads to expected utility δ
t
i vi if others accept and δ
t+1
i u
∗
i if some other player rejects. In 
either case, expected utility is bounded above by δt+1i u
∗
i . 
In order to prove that the game  has a pure SSPE, we show that the function z has a zero point.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let a, ¯a in Rm be such that a  a¯. The function f : [a, ¯a] → Rm is outward pointing at a ∈ [a, ¯a] if f (a) = 0
and, for k = 1, . . . , m, ak = ak implies fk(a) ≤ 0, ak < ak < a¯k implies fk(a) = 0, and ak = a¯k implies fk(a) ≥ 0. A function is 
outward pointing if it is outward pointing at some point of [a, ¯a].
We remark that the function f is outward pointing at a point a of the set [a, ¯a] if and only if f (a) is a non-zero element 
of the normal cone of [a, ¯a] at the point a.
We show next that the excess utility function z is not outward pointing.
Lemma 3.3. The excess utility function z is continuous and not outward pointing.
Proof. The continuity of z follows immediately from its deﬁnition and property G1, which states that g is continuous.
Trivially, z is not outward pointing at any u in the interior of [0N , ¯v].
Suppose z is outward pointing at u ∈ [0N , ¯v] such that ui = v¯ i for some i ∈ N . Fix any such player i. Then zi(u) ≥ 0. 
Since clearly it is not the case that ui = v¯ i ≤ 0, we have i ∈ N∗ and so g(pi(u)) ≥ 0, hence pi(u) ∈ V . Since the vector pi(u)
is non-negative, it is an element of V+ .
Assume ﬁrst that the cardinality of N∗ is equal to 1 so N∗ = {i}. Then θi = 1, and θ j = 0 if j = i. If there is j ∈ N \ N∗
with u j > 0, then z j(u) = −u j < 0, which contradicts that z is outward pointing at u. If u j = 0 for every j = i, then 
zi(u) = g(pi(u)) = g(u) ≤ 0 and z j(u) = −u j = 0 if j = i. By the previous paragraph zi(u) ≥ 0, so in fact z(u) = 0, and z is 
not outward pointing at u.
Assume next that the cardinality of N∗ is greater than or equal to 2, so that αi > 1. Then pii(u) = αiui > ui = v¯ i which 
contradicts our choice of the vector v¯ and the fact that pi(u) ∈ V+ .
Suppose z is outward pointing at 0N . For each i ∈ N∗ it holds that zi(0N ) = g(pi(0N )) = g(0N ) > 0, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose z is outward pointing at u such that 0N ≤ u  v¯ , with 0 = ui for some i ∈ N and 0 < u j for some j ∈ N . 
Since z is outward pointing, it holds that z j(u) = 0. It follows that j ∈ N∗ and g(p j(u)) = 0, which means that p j(u) ∈ V . 
For each i ∈ N∗ with ui = 0 it holds that pi(u) ≤ p j(u), so pi(u) ∈ V and consequently zi(u) = g(pi(u)) ≥ 0. This shows that 
zi(u) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N with ui = 0. Since z is outward pointing at u it follows that zi(u) = 0 for every i such that ui = 0. We 
ﬁnd that z(u) = 0, a contradiction to z being outward pointing at u. 
Hartman and Stampacchia (1966) have shown that for any continuous function on a compact, convex subset C of Rm
mapping into Rm , there is a point c ∈ C such that the function value at c belongs to the normal cone of C at c. Eaves (1971)
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ﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.2 has the property that every stationary point is a zero point. Continuous functions on [a, ¯a] that are not 
outward pointing therefore have a zero point. To make the paper self-contained, we present a simple proof of this fact next.
Lemma 3.4. Let a, ¯a in Rm be such that a  a¯ and let the continuous function f 0 : [a, ¯a] →Rm be not outward pointing. Then f 0 has 
a zero point.
Proof. Let C = [a − 1m, ¯a+ 1m]. We deﬁne the function f 1 : C →Rm by
f 1(a) = λ(a)(π[a,a¯](a) − a) + (1− λ(a)) f 0(π[a,a¯](a)), a ∈ C,
where π[a,a¯] is the orthogonal projection function on [a, ¯a], a function that is continuous, and
λ(a) = ‖π[a,a¯](a) − a‖∞, a ∈ C,
so the function λ : C → [0, 1] measures the distance in inﬁnity norm from the point a to its projection. The function λ is 
continuous and has the property that it is equal to 1 on the boundary of C , equal to 0 on [a, ¯a], and strictly in between 0 
and 1 everywhere else. We deﬁne the function f 2 : C → C by
f 2(a) = πC (a + f 1(a)), a ∈ C .
The function f 2 is a continuous function deﬁned on a non-empty, compact, convex set, so has a ﬁxed point, say a∗ , by 
Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem.
Suppose a∗ belongs to the boundary of C , i.e. λ(a∗) = 1. Then
a∗ = f 2(a∗) = πC (a∗ + f 1(a∗)) = πC (a∗ + π[a,a¯](a∗) − a∗) = π[a,a¯](a∗) = a∗,
a contradiction. It follows that a∗ is not in the boundary of the set C , i.e. it belongs to its interior. From this it follows that
a∗ = πC (a∗ + f 1(a∗)) = a∗ + f 1(a∗),
so f 1(a∗) = 0m . Using the deﬁnition of f 1 it then follows that
f 0(π[a,a¯](a∗)) = − λ(a
∗)
1− λ(a∗) (π[a,a¯](a
∗) − a∗).
Now if a∗ is not an element of the set [a, ¯a], then 0 < λ(a∗) < 1 and the vector a∗ − π[a,a¯](a∗) is a non-zero element of the 
normal cone of [a, ¯a] at the point π[a,a¯](a∗). But this means that f 0 is outward pointing at π[a,a¯](a∗), a contradiction. We 
conclude that a∗ ∈ [a, ¯a]. Thus λ(a∗) = 0 and π[a,a¯](a∗) = a∗ , so a∗ is a zero point of the function f 0. 
Corollary 3.5. The excess utility function z has a zero point.
Corollary 3.6. The game  admits a pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium.
Example 3.7. Consider the set of feasible payoffs
V = {v ∈R2 | v1 ≤ 2, v2 ≤ 2, min{v1, v2} ≤ 1},
which is depicted in Fig. 1. An upper bound on V+ is given by v¯ = (2, 2). Players are selected as proposer with equal 
probability, so θ1 = θ2 = 1/2.
We describe all subgame perfect equilibria selected by the excess utility function z. Since αi = 2 − δi , the excess utility 
function z is then deﬁned by
z1(u) = g(p1(u)) = g((2− δ1)u1, δ2u2), u ∈ [0, v¯],
z2(u) = g(p2(u)) = g(δ1u1, (2− δ2)u2), u ∈ [0, v¯].
The relevant part of the boundary of V consists of four types of line segments, characterized by 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1 and v2 = 2, 
v1 = 1 and 1 ≤ v2 ≤ 2, 1 ≤ v1 ≤ 2 and v2 = 1, and v1 = 2 and 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 1. Since in equilibrium both p1(u) and p2(u)
belong to such a line segment, there are potentially sixteen types of equilibria, where a type of equilibrium corresponds to 
a particular combination of line segments to which the proposals of the two players belong. When we solve for z(u) = 0 for 
each of the sixteen resulting systems of equations, and taking into account that 0 ≤ δ1, δ2 < 1, we ﬁnd equilibrium utility 
levels u∗1 and u∗2. From these, we can derive the equilibrium proposals x∗1 and x∗2 and the equilibrium acceptance sets A∗1
and A∗2. The equilibrium proposals are displayed in Table 1. It turns out that only six out of the potential sixteen types of 
equilibrium can actually occur, labeled by A to F. The conditions on the discount factors that lead to a particular equilibrium 
type are displayed in Table 1 and depicted in Fig. 2.
P.J.-J. Herings, A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 90 (2015) 151–161 157Fig. 1. The set of feasible payoffs.
Fig. 2. Equilibrium regions.
Table 1
A summary of the possible equilibrium proposals.
Discount factors x∗1 x∗2
A 0 ≤ δ1 < 1, 23 < δ2 < 1 (1, 2δ22−δ2 ) (
δ1
2−δ1 ,2)
B 0 ≤ δ1 < 1, δ2 = 23 ((2− δ1)u∗1,1) (δ1u∗1,2) 12−δ1 ≤ u∗1 ≤min{ 22−δ1 , 1δ1 }
C 0 ≤ δ1 < 23 , 0 ≤ δ2 < 23 (2, 2δ22−δ2 ) (
2δ1
2−δ1 ,2)
D δ1 > 23 , δ2 >
2
3 (
2−δ1
δ1
,1) (1, 2−δ2
δ2
)
E δ1 = 23 , 0≤ δ2 < 1 (2, δ2u∗2) (1, (2− δ2)u∗2) 12−δ2 ≤ u∗2 ≤min{ 22−δ2 , 1δ2 }
F 23 < δ1 < 1, 0≤ δ2 < 1 (2, δ22−δ2 ) (
2δ1
2−δ1 ,1)
Table 1 in conjunction with Fig. 2 shows that equilibria are unique for discount factors in Regions A, C, and F in case at 
least one player has a discount factor below 2/3 and no player has a discount factor equal to 2/3. When the discount factor 
of at least one player is exactly equal to 2/3, we are in Regions B or E, and there are inﬁnitely many equilibria and inﬁnitely 
many possible equilibrium utilities. Finally, when both players have a discount factor above 2/3, equilibria of type A, D, 
and F co-exist. Fig. 3 illustrates a typical combination of proposals for the various types of equilibria. Fig. 4 illustrates the 
three possible equilibria when δ1 = δ2 = 5/6.
A striking feature of Example 3.7 is that the equilibrium proposals are typically not Pareto optimal, but only weakly so. 
The only exception are cases where δ1 = 2/3 or δ2 = 2/3, when there is a continuum of equilibria, and only one equilibrium 
in the continuum involves Pareto optimal proposals.
The most extreme equilibrium proposals for player 1 are x∗1 = (2, 0), which occurs when δ2 = 0 and 0 ≤ δ1 < 2/3, and 
x∗1 = (1, 2 − ε) when δ2 = (4 − 2ε)/(4 − ε) and 0 ≤ δ1 < 1. Notice that in the latter equilibrium, player 1 may offer more to 
player 2 than to himself, even if player 1 is more patient than player 2.
Another interesting feature of this example is that comparative statics may be counterintuitive. Consider the symmetric 
equilibrium corresponding to Region D when both players have discount rates exceeding 2/3. In this region it holds that in-
creasing patience worsens the bargaining position of a player. When discount rates converge to 1, the equilibrium proposals 
of both players converge to (1, 1), a payoff that is weakly dominated for both players by alternative payoffs.
The example also demonstrates that equilibrium proposals are not even weakly Pareto optimal when compared to lot-
teries over feasible payoffs. When players become suﬃciently patient, their equilibrium proposals become arbitrarily close 
to (1, 1). A lottery that selects payoff (2, 1) with probability 1/2 and payoff (1, 2) with probability 1/2 gives strictly higher 
utility to both players than both equilibrium proposals.
158 P.J.-J. Herings, A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 90 (2015) 151–161Fig. 3. Equilibrium proposals.
Fig. 4. δ1 = 56 , δ2 = 56 : A , D ◦, F .
Not every stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is in the form expressed by Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2). Indeed, for every δ1
and δ2 greater than 1/2 there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium where both players propose one of the two 
Pareto-optimal points, say the point (1, 2). In such an equilibrium the proposals are x1 = x2 = (1, 2) and the acceptance sets 
are A1 = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ δ1} and A2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ 2δ2}. The pair (x, A) is indeed a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium 
provided that 1/2 < δ1 < 1 and 1/2 < δ2 < 1. In the next section we will identify a simple assumption under which every 
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium satisﬁes Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2).
4. A characterization of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria
Banks and Duggan (2000) show that if the set V satisﬁes assumptions (A) and (B) and, moreover, is strictly convex, then 
every no-delay stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is in pure strategies.
In this section we only use assumptions (A) and (B) and employ the additional assumption that each weakly Pareto-
eﬃcient point of V+ is Pareto eﬃcient. Under this assumption we show that in every stationary subgame perfect equilibrium 
of the game , each player chooses a pure strategy on the equilibrium path, leading to a proposal which is immediately 
accepted by all the players. Furthermore, the vector of utilities in any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of  is a zero 
of the function z as deﬁned in Section 3.
Let B be the set of Borel subsets of V . A stationary strategy for player i ∈ N∗ can be summarized by a pair (μi, τ i)
where μi : B → [0, 1] is a probability measure and τ i : V → [0, 1] is a B-measurable function. The number μi(B) is the 
probability for player i to choose a proposal from the Borel set B , and τ i(v) is the probability for player i to accept the 
proposal v . For a player i ∈ N \ N∗ , the stationary strategy speciﬁes only the function τ i . Given a strategy proﬁle (μ, τ ), let 
τ (v) = τ 1(v) × · · · × τn(v) denote the probability that the proposal v is unanimously accepted. Let ui denote the expected 
utility to player i. Conditional on receiving the proposal v , player i’s expected utility is equal to [τ (v)vi + (1 − τ (v))δiui]. 
Thus ui satisﬁes the equation
ui =
∑
j∈N∗
θ j
∫
V
[τ (v)vi + (1− τ (v))δiui]dμ j(v). (4.1)
Notice that Eq. (4.1) admits exactly one solution.
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stationary subgame perfect equilibria where both the proposers and the responders play mixed actions. Below we construct 
a subgame perfect equilibrium where player 1 proposes several points of the form (x, 1) with positive probability. To support 
this as an equilibrium strategy we choose the functions τ 2 in such a way that the expected utility for player 1 from 
proposing each point (x, 1) is the same for every x in some non-degenerate interval. Player 2 plays a mixed response to 
each proposal (x, 1) of player 1 because his equilibrium continuation utility is 1, so he is indifferent between accepting and 
rejecting each such proposal. Similarly, player 2 proposes several points of the form (1, x) with positive probability, and 
player 1 plays a mixed response to each proposal (1, x) of player 2.
Fix δi = δ ∈ (2/3, 1) and let
S1 = {v ∈ V |(2− δ)/δ ≤ v1 ≤ 2 and v2 = 1},
S2 = {v ∈ V |(2− δ)/δ ≤ v2 ≤ 2 and v1 = 1}.
Let μ1 and μ2 be arbitrarily chosen probability distributions on B such that μi(Si) = 1. Deﬁne the functions τ 1 and τ 2 as
τ 1(v) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2(1− δ)
δ(v2 − 1) , if v ∈ S
2,
1, if v1 > 1,
0, otherwise,
τ 2(v) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2(1− δ)
δ(v1 − 1) , if v ∈ S
1,
1, if v2 > 1,
0, otherwise.
This strategy proﬁle results in an expected utility of ui = 1/δ to both players. To see this, we verify next that ui = 1/δ
solves Eq. (4.1). Thus assume that the expected utility to each player i is indeed 1/δ. Then the expected utility to player 1
following the proposal v is given by
τ (v)v1 + (1− τ (v))δu1 =
{
(2− δ)/δ, if v ∈ S1,
1, if v ∈ S2.
Since player i’s proposal is chosen from Si with probability 1, the right-hand side of Eq. (4.1) is (2 − δ)/2δ + 1/2 = 1/δ. 
Thus u1 = 1/δ indeed solves Eq. (4.1). Of course, the argument for player 2 is symmetric.
Now, each proposal in Si gives player i the same expected utility, namely (2 − δ)/δ and no proposal outside Si gives 
a higher expected utility. Thus choosing, possibly at random, a proposal from Si is sequentially rational for each player i. 
Furthermore, player j is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a proposal v ∈ Si of player i = j, since either way 
player j obtains an expected utility of 1. Thus player j can play a mixed response to any proposal from Si . This establishes 
that the joint strategy above is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Recall that a point v ∈ V is said to be weakly Pareto-eﬃcient if there is no point x ∈ V such that xi > vi for each i ∈ N . It 
is Pareto-eﬃcient if there is no point x ∈ V such that xi ≥ vi for each i ∈ N with one inequality being strict. We employ the 
following additional assumption:
(C) Each weakly Pareto-eﬃcient point of V+ is Pareto eﬃcient.
Assumption (C) is widely used in the literature and is often referred to as the condition of “non-levelness” of the relevant 
part of the boundary of the set V .
We now proceed to show that if the payoff set satisﬁes the assumptions (A), (B), and (C), then in any stationary subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the game , (i) each proposer plays a pure strategy, i.e. chooses some proposal with probability 1, 
and (ii) the equilibrium proposal is accepted by each responder with probability 1. The intuition for the result can be 
summarized as follows: Given a vector of equilibrium utilities there is only one proposal that maximizes the proposer’s 
utility subject to meeting the reservation utility of all the responders. Thus the proposer has a unique best response. And 
the responders have to accept the equilibrium proposals with probability one since otherwise the proposer will not have a 
well-deﬁned best response. Notice that Theorem 4.2 leaves open the possibility that the responders cast a vote at random 
when responding to an out of equilibrium proposal.
Theorem 4.2. Let the strategy proﬁle σ = (μ, τ ) be an SSPE of . Then for each i ∈ N∗ there exists a proposal xi in V such that 
μi({xi}) = 1 and τ j(xi) = 1 for all j ∈ N. Furthermore, the equilibrium utility u induced by σ satisﬁes z(u) = 0.
Proof. For i ∈ N , let ri = δiui . Deﬁne the sets D and B by
D =
⋂
{v ∈ V | vi ≥ ri} and B =
⋂
{v ∈ V | vi > ri}.i∈N i∈N
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Indeed, rejecting any proposal yields a player a utility of zero irrespective of the strategies of other players. Thus, in any 
Nash equilibrium of the game  the utility to any player is at least zero.
Step 1: If v ∈ V is such that τ (v) > 0, then v ∈ D .
Suppose τ (v) > 0 and consider a history h at time period 0 after which player i has to respond to the proposal v . 
Notice that according to the strategy proﬁle σ all players accept v with strictly positive probability. A rejection of v by 
player i yields him a utility of ri , while accepting it yields a utility of vi with some positive probability and ri with the 
complementary probability. Since, according to the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy proﬁle σ , player i accepts v with 
positive probability, we must have the inequality vi ≥ ri .
Step 2: If v ∈ B , then τ (v) = 1.
Suppose without loss of generality that the players respond in the sequence 1, . . . , n. Consider a history h at time 
period 0 after which player n has to respond to the proposal v . All players preceding player n have accepted the proposal v , 
because otherwise player n is not requested to cast his vote by deﬁnition of the game . Accepting v by player n yields 
him a utility of vn , while rejecting it leads to a utility of δnun = rn . Thus player n has to accept v with probability 1. We 
conclude that τn(v) = 1.
Suppose that τi+1(v) = · · · = τn(v) = 1 for some i. Consider a history h at time period 0 after which player i has to 
respond to the proposal v . According to the deﬁnition of the game , the players preceding i in the response sequence 
have all accepted the proposal v . The players i + 1, . . . , n will accept the proposal v with probability 1 by the induction 
hypothesis, if player i accepts it. Thus accepting v by player i yields a utility of vi , while rejecting it gives a utility of 
δiui = ri . We conclude that τi(v) = 1.
Step 3: The set B is non-empty.
Suppose B is an empty set. We show next that then D ⊂ {r}. For suppose the set D contains a point v other than r. 
Then the point r is not Pareto-eﬃcient and, by Assumption (C), it is not weakly Pareto-eﬃcient. It follows that there is a 
point v ∈ V such that vi > ri for each i ∈ N . But such a point v is an element of the set B , a contradiction. This establishes 
that the set D is either empty or it contains the point r alone.
For each i ∈ N and each v ∈ V , it holds that τ (v)vi + (1 − τ (v))δiui = δiui , since it follows from Step 1 that if τ (v) > 0, 
then v = r, whereas the equality is trivial when τ (v) = 0. Using Eq. 4.1 we ﬁnd that ui = δiui for each i ∈ N . We conclude 
that u = 0. But 0 belongs to the interior of V by Assumption (A), which implies that B = ∩i∈N{v ∈ V | vi > 0} is a non-empty 
set, a contradiction.
Step 4: The set D equals the closure of B .
Take v ∈ D and an open neighborhood O of v . We must show that the intersection O  ∩ B is non-empty. Consider the 
point y = (1 − λ)v + λr for some λ ∈ (0, 1) chosen small enough such that y lies in the set O . Since ri ≤ yi ≤ vi for each 
i ∈ N and since V is comprehensive from below by Assumption (A), y ∈ D . The point y is not Pareto-eﬃcient. Indeed, if 
y = v , then y = r, which is not Pareto-eﬃcient because the set B is non-empty. And if y is not equal to v , it is dominated 
by v . Hence, by Assumption (C), the point y is not weakly Pareto-eﬃcient. Thus there is a point x ∈ V such that yi < xi
for all i ∈ N . Consider the point x() = x + (1 − )y for 0 <  < 1. Since ri ≤ yi < xi() ≤ xi for each i ∈ N and since V is 
comprehensive from below, x() ∈ B . And since y ∈ O , one can choose  small enough so that x() ∈ O .
Step 5: For i ∈ N∗ , the set Xi = argmax{vi |v ∈ D} contains a single element, xi . The point xi lies on the boundary of V and 
xij = r j for each j ∈ N \ {i} and xii > ri .
The set Xi is non-empty, because D is a compact set. Take any point x ∈ Xi and suppose r j < x j for some j ∈ N \ {i}. 
Deﬁne the point v by the equation
vk =
{
xk, if k ∈ N \ { j},
r j, if k = j.
Thus vk ≤ xk with strict inequality for k = j. Since V is comprehensive from below by Assumption (A), v ∈ V . Furthermore, 
the point v is not Pareto-eﬃcient being dominated by x. Hence by Assumption (C) it is not weakly Pareto-eﬃcient. Therefore, 
there exists a point y ∈ V such that vk < yk for each k ∈ N . Since rk ≤ xk = vk < yk for each k ∈ N \ { j} and r j = v j < y j , 
the point y is an element of D . Furthermore xi < yi , contradicting the choice of x in Xi .
We have thus shown that, for each x ∈ Xi , for each j ∈ N \ {i}, x j = r j . It now follows at once that Xi contains a single 
element.
If xi were not a boundary point of V , there would be a point y ∈ V such that xk < yk for all k ∈ N . Such a point y would 
then be in the set D , contradicting the fact that xi is an element of Xi . Finally, xii > ri for otherwise x
i = r, while r is not an 
element of the boundary of V .
Step 6: For i ∈ N∗ , it holds that μi({xi}) = 1 and τ (xi) = 1.
Let qi(v) = τ (v)vi + (1 − τ (v))ri be the utility to player i from proposing the point v ∈ V and let Q i = argmax{qi(v)|
v ∈ V } and qi =max{qi(v)|v ∈ V }. Since μi is part of an SSPE, we have that μi(Q i) = 1. In particular, Q i is a non-empty set. 
By Step 2, any point v of B is accepted with probability 1. Hence qi ≥ vi for each v ∈ B . Since by Step 4 the set D is the 
closure of B , we must have qi ≥ vi for each v ∈ D , and therefore qi ≥ xi . On the other hand, if v ∈ V \ D then τ (v) = 0 by i
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hence Q i ⊂ {xi}. Thus μ({xi}) = 1 and Q i = {xi} and qi = q(xi). Now if τ (xi) < 1 then qi = qi(xi) < xii ≤ qi , a contradiction. 
Hence τ (xi) = 1.
Step 7: The vector of ex ante expected utilities u satisﬁes z(u) = 0.
By Step 5 we have xij = δ ju j for each i ∈ N∗ and each j ∈ N such that j = i. Eq. (4.1) now reads
ui =
∑
j∈N∗
θ j x
j
i = θi xii + (1− θi)δiui .
Thus if i ∈ N∗ then xii = αiui and therefore xi = pi(u). And, also by Step 5, the point xi lies in the boundary of the set V , so 
z(pi(u)) = 0. And if i ∈ N \ N∗ , then ui = 0, since this is the only solution to ui = δui . In either case zi(u) = 0. 
5. Conclusion
The presence of non-convexities poses many problems in economic modeling. Such problems are usually resolved by the 
use of lotteries, which convexify the problem. In this paper we argue that the canonical model of non-cooperative bargaining 
does not involve such diﬃculties. Even when the set of feasible payoffs is not convex, there exists a pure stationary subgame 
perfect equilibrium satisfying the no-delay property. The only assumptions on the set of feasible payoffs that are needed for 
this result are that the set of feasible payoffs is closed, comprehensive from below, and that its restriction to the individually 
rational payoffs is bounded.
When we impose the mild additional requirement that the weak Pareto optimal payoffs in the set of feasible payoffs 
coincide with the Pareto optimal ones, we also obtain the reverse result that all subgame perfect equilibria in stationary 
strategies use pure strategies on the equilibrium path and lead to absence of delay. When players bargain in a non-convex 
environment, it is not only the case that equilibria without randomization exist, but even stronger, there are no equilibria 
where randomization is used. Nevertheless, it is easy to construct examples where stationary mixed strategy proﬁles would 
lead to Pareto improvements of the equilibrium utilities.
Here we have restricted ourselves to the canonical model of non-cooperative bargaining. It is natural to examine to what 
extent our main results are also valid in extensions of this basic model, allowing for more general proposer selection and 
cake processes as studied for instance in Merlo and Wilson (1995). We have studied the classical case with unanimous 
acceptance of proposals. A generalization of our results to the case with a general set of decisive coalitions as in Banks and 
Duggan (2000) will fail to hold, since in such a setting pure stationary subgame perfect equilibria may fail to exist even 
when the sets of feasible payoffs are convex. The assumption of unanimous approval seems therefore to be crucial for the 
existence of pure stationary subgame perfect equilibria and the absence of randomization in general environments.
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